Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly
David Myatt,
Justin P. Johnson,
Johnson Graduate School of Management and
Cornell University
No 145, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We present a general Cournot model in which each firm may sell multiple quality-differentiated products. We use an upgrades approach, working not with the actual products, but instead with upgrades from one quality to the next. The properties of single-product Cournot models carry over to the supply of upgrades, but not necessarily to the supply of complete products. A firm`s product line is determined by the properties of demand, its costs, and competitor characteristics. For symmetric firms, these determinants reduce to returns to quality and changes in demand elasticity as quality increases. For asymmetric firms whose (potentially endogenous) technological capabilities are defined by their maximum feasible qualities, gaps in product lines are determined precisely by the capabilities of lesser rivals. Strategic commitment to product lines prior to quantity competition is considered. Incentives to so commit are markedly different from those under price-setting models.
Keywords: multiproduct quality competition; multiproduct oligopoly; brands; Cournot competition; price discrimination; product lines (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Multiproduct Cournot oligopoly (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:145
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