The Not-So-Absent-Minded Driver

Oliver Board ()

No 147, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper starts with a re-examination of Piccione and Rubinstein`s Absent-Minded Driver problem, and suggests a novel interpretation of Aumann, Hart and Perry`s notion of action-optimality. We then consider several variants of the original problem in which the assumption that the player`s information sets partition the set of his decision nodes is relaxed. This relaxation enables us to construct a counter-example to Piccione and Rubinstein`s result that planning-optimal strategies are always action-optimal. We also show that an agent with more information may do worse than an agent with less.

Keywords: absentmindedness; action optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: The not-so-absent-minded driver (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:147

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