Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games

Oliver Board ()

No 148, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We construct a dynamic epistemic model for extensive form games, which generates a hierarchy of beliefs for each player over her opponents` strategies and beliefs, and tells us how those beliefs will be revised as the game proceeds. We use the model to analyze the implications of the assumption that the players possess common (true) belief in rationality, thus extending the concept of rationalizability to extensive form games.

Keywords: rationalizability; extensive form games; belief revision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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