Evolution in Teams

David Myatt and Chris Wallace

No 177, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Team formation will often involve a coordination problem. If no-one else is contributing to a team, there is little point in an agent exerting any effort. Similarly, once a team is formed, an agent within the team will not leave, as to do so would result in team collapse; non-contributing agents would not join, as they currently receive the benefits of the team`s efforts whilst paying none of the costs. The methods of the stochastic adjustment dynamics literature can help select between these equilibria. Team and population size, and cost and benefit parameters all play a role in determining the chances of successful team formation. Increasing the pool of agents from which to choose team members seems at first glance to have a positive impact upon team formation. However, just one bad apple within the extended pool can have a disproportionate effect on the outcome. Although an agent with high participation costs would never contribute to a successful team, their mere presence alone can result in the failure of an otherwise successful team.

Keywords: collective action; evolution; teamwork; equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11-01
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Related works:
Chapter: The Evolution of Teams (2005)
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