Collective and unitary models: a clarification

Valérie Lechene (), Martin Browning, University of Copenhagen, Pierre Chiappori and University of Chicago

No 191, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this note we identify and clarify a confusion that has arisen in the literature about the exact relationship between unitary and collective models and what enters the Pareto weight and the sharing function. We suggest that we should denote as `unitary` any model that leads to outcomes that satisfy the Slutsky conditions whether or not these outcomes depend on distribution factors. In particular, income pooling is neither necessary nor sufficient for a unitary model. We also show that the presence of prices or total expenditure in the sharing rule cannot be used as a test for a unitary model.

Keywords: Unitary; Collective; Intrahousehold Allocation; Distribution Factors; Demand. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Collective and Unitary Models: A Clarification (2006)
Working Paper: Collective and Unitary Models: a Clarification (2004)
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