Strategic Hedging and Investment Efficiency

Clara Raposo

No 2000-FE-02, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper links real investment policy to corporate risk management, endogenizing the costs of external financing. Previous literature finds investment efficiency linked to full hedging. In this model, a firm with proprietary information when deciding its investment in a valuable project, may not choose to fully hedge in equilibrium, and this can improve investment efficiency. The size of the project, the hedged value of cash-earnings, and the timing of information revelation, influence the risk management equilibrium. Results are derived under a constraint of no-distress at the time of the investment decision. When this constraint is relaxed, it results in a bargaining situation between shareholders, the counterparty on the contract utilized to manage risk, and new investors. Depending on the bargaining solution, the firm may still prefer to not hedge, facing distress in some states. When this occurs investment efficiency is enhanced. The sources of external finance are debt and equity. The issue of disclosure regarding risk exposure plays a crucial role.

Keywords: Corporate risk management; Investment efficiency; Capital budgeting; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D84 G31 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-06-01
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