Multinational Bank Capital Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects

Alan Morrison and Gyongyi Loranth

No 2003-FE-11, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyse a model in which bank deposits are insured and there is an exogenous cost of bank capital. The former effect results in bank overinvestment and the latter in underinvestment. Regulatory capital requirements introduce investment distortions which are a constrained optimal response to these market imperfections. We show that capital requirements which are constrained optimal for national banks result in underinvestment by multinational banks. The extent of underinvestment depends upon the home bank`s riskiness, the extent of international diversification, and the liability structure (branch or subsidiary) of the multinational. Capital requirements for international banks should therefore reflect these effects. We relate our findings to observed features of multinational banks and we discuss the possible existence of a multinational bank channel for financial contagion.

Keywords: Capital adequacy requirements; deposit insurance; multinati (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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