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Global Uniqueness and Money Non-neutrality in a Walrasian Dynamics without Rational Expectations

Dimitrios Tsomocos, Gaël Giraud, Cnrs and Universite Paris-1

No 2004-FE-15, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We define a non-tatonnement dynamics in continuous-time for pure-exchange economies with outside and inside fiat money. Traders are myopic, face a cash-in-advance constraint, and play dominant strategies in a short-run monetary strategic market game involving the limit-price mechanism. The profits of the Bank are redistributed to its private share-holders, but they can use them to pay their own debts only in the next period. Provided there is enough inside money, monetary trade curves converge towards Pareto optimal allocations; money has a positive value along each trade curve, except on the optimal rest-point where it becomes a veil while trades vanish. Moreoever, generically, given initial conditions, there is a piecewise globally unique trade-and-price curve not only in real, but also in nominal variables. Finally, money is locally neutral in the short-run and non-neutral in the long-run.

Date: 2004-09-01
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Working Paper: Global uniqueness and money non-neutrality in a Walrasian dynamics without rational expectations (2004) Downloads
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