Job Design and the Benefits of Private Trade

Pablo Casas-Arce, Santhi Hejeebu and Cornell College

No 204, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), to include career concerns considerations. When reputations are considered, discretion may play a more integral part of the incentive scheme. It can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection of low ability agents. We then show that these synergies are useful in explaining the employment of U.S. faculty members and the employment of agents in the English East India Company, an historically important firm.

Keywords: Job Design; Multitasking; Career Concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 J41 L14 M52 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09-01
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