List Prices, Bargaining and Resultant Productivity Diffusion Delay

John Thanassoulis

No 220, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: List prices are not completely credible as take it or leave it prices: buyers are able to seek reductions by bargaining with firms. We show that this realisation leads to the existence of a critical threshold number of competitors in an industry which depends on fundamentals. In industries with fewer competitors than the critical level, there is productivity diffuson delay: low and high cost firms coexist, list prices have no information value and transaction price dispersion exists. Above this critical number of competitors, efficient firms price to drive the high cost firms from the market: productivity gains diffuse to consumers and list prices now carry cost information. Prices never fall to the Bertrand floor however. All of these results are in close keeping with, and provide an explanation for empirical results showing productivity dispersion persistence and the explanatory power of having 5 competitors or more (Nickell 1996).

Keywords: Bargaining; List Prices; Transaction Prices; Bertrand Paradox; Productivity; Productivity Diffusion Delay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D43 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:42f962cc-967f-4e7e-a66e-7c4d05bfcd1c (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:220

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Pouliquen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).