Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods

Valérie Lechene (v.lechene@ucl.ac.uk), Ian Preston and University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies

No 226, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. While adding-up and homogneity hold, negativity and symmetry properties are generally violated. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric and negative semidefinite matrix and another the rank of which never exceeds the number of public goods plus one. Under separability of the public goods the deviation from symmetry is at most rank two.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrum; Intra-household Allocation; Slutsky Symmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-03-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b68733fb-66ca-4e7b-9bf7-9a75a980cc94 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarily contributed public goods (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:226

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Pouliquen (facultyadmin@economics.ox.ac.uk this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).