When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action

David Myatt and Chris Wallace

No 269, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies n-player collective-action games in which a public good is produced if and only if m or more volunteers contribute to it. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team of m players successfully provide, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterisation of long-run play reveals the determinants of success. These include the correlation between players` costs of provision and their valuations for the good. The addition of an extra bad apple player can spoil the barrel by destabilising successful teams. A contemporary application is the team-based provision of open-source software. The analysis reveals the features of successful open-source projects, and suggests a rationale for limiting the pool of possible contributors.

Keywords: Collective Action; Evolution; Teams; Equilibrium Selection; Concordance; Open-Source Software (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-knm, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:269

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