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Quelques resultats sur l`effet des transferts cibles

Valérie Lechene () and Martin Browning
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pierre Chiappori ()

No 294, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Allocations familiales et autres transferts cibles sont generalement verses aux meres, sur la base de l`observation qu`augmenter la part des ressources controlees par les meres conduit a ameliorer le bien-etre des enfants. Nous recensons un ensemble de resultats empiriques qui etablisent le bien-fonde de ces mesures. Nous contrastons ensuite les predictions theoriques des principales alternatives au modele standard de comportement des menages, le modele unitaire. Ceci permet d`etablir que l`effet predit des transferts depend des preferences individuelles et du pouvoir des membres du menage, mais aussi crucialement de la forme des interactions dans le menage.

Keywords: Transferts Cibles; Equilibre de Nash; Modele Collectif; Solution de Nash; Allocation Intra-Familiale; Mise en Commun des Ressources; Spheres Separees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2006-11-01
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