Efficiency Gain from Ownership Deregulation: Estimates for the Radio Industry

Howard Smith and Catherine O'Gorman

No 385, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Reducing fixed cost duplication - a common justification for concentrated market structure - motivated the US government to relax the number of radio stations a firm could operate in any local market. After deregulation the number of firms per market decreased. The implied cost saving depends on the per market fixed costs incurred by each firm. Using data from 140 markets we estimate upper and lower bounds to fixed costs using (i) an empirical model of gross profit and (ii) the assumption that the observed post-deregulation market structure is a Nash equilibrium. The estimates suggest that the efficiency savings were significant.

Keywords: Moment Inequalities; Deregulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L40 L8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-eff and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:8d98c7e2-f827-46b6-a419-bcc16ae86402 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency Gain from Ownership Deregulation: Estimates for the Radio Industry (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:385

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Pouliquen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).