Money Burning and Stealing in the Laboratory: How Conflicting Ideologies Emerge

Daniel Zizzo

No 40, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Three experiments on utility interdependence are discussed. Subjects receive money by betting and possibly by arbitrary assignments. They can then pay to reduce and, possibly, redistribute the steal money; in one case, only the decisions of a randomly determined dictator are implemented. The behavior of 80% of burners and redistributors was rank egalitarian. However, arbitrarily advantaged and disadvantaged subjects developed conflicting views of desert: arbitrarily disadvantaged subjects targeted arbitrarily assigned money; arbitrarily advantaged subjects did not care about how money was gained, and, if stealing was allowed, were twice as aggressive against earned money than against money assigned arbitrarily.

Keywords: interdependent preferences; fairness; desert; egalitarianism; ideology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-01
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