Competition Policy and Property Rights
John Vickers
No 436, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics
Abstract:
One of the most controversial questions in current competition policy is when, if ever, should competition law require a firm with market power to share its property, notably intellectual property, with its rivals? And if supply is required, on what terms? These questions are discussed with reference to recent law cases including the EC Microsoft judgment of 2007 and the US linkLine case of 2009. The analysis focuses on whether competition law and regulation are complements or substitutes, and on incentives for investment and (sequential) innovation.
Keywords: Property rights; Refusal to supply; Price squeeze; Intellectual property; Sequential innovation; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Journal Article: Competition Policy and Property Rights (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:436
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