Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utilities and externalities

Dominik Karos ()

No 741, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to solve games with non-transferable utilities and externalities. We show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegoiated. In the original game derived from these payoff configurations, we can find a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions. For games without externalities this partition and the corrresponding payoffs constitute a strong Nash equilirium in a strategic form game with complete information. We use our model to provide a common framework for a variety of solutions for cooperative games, bargaining problems and bankruptcy problems.

Keywords: Games with non-transferable utilities in partition function form; Bargaining with claims; Ordinal games; Core stable partitions; Non-cooperative coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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