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Competing Sales Channels

David Ronayne () and Greg Taylor ()

No 843, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Abstract We study strategic interactions in markets where ï¬ rms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers’ offers are visible at once. We ask how a CC’s relative size influences market outcomes. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, such seemingly procompetitive developments can raise prices and reduce consumer surplus by weakening between-channel competition. We also use the model to study relevant active policy issues including price clauses, integrated ownership structures, and access to consumers’ purchase data. Revised March 2019

JEL-codes: D43 D83 L11 M3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-mkt
Date: 2019-03-18
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