Competing Sales Channels
David Ronayne () and
Greg Taylor ()
No 843, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics
Abstract We study strategic interactions in markets where ï¬ rms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellersâ€™ oï¬€ers are visible at once. We ask how a CCâ€™s relative size inï¬‚uences market outcomes. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, such seemingly procompetitive developments can raise prices and reduce consumer surplus by weakening between-channel competition. We also use the model to study relevant active policy issues including price clauses, integrated ownership structures, and access to consumersâ€™ purchase data. Revised March 2019
JEL-codes: D43 D83 L11 M3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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