Testing Nash Bargaining Household Models With Time Series Data: Divorce Law Reform and Female Suicide in Canada

John Hoddinott and Christopher Adam ()

Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Recent literature surveys indicate the absence of definitive evidence distinguishing unitary from collective models of the household. In this paper, we exploit dramatic changes in divorce law legislation in Canada to test one variant of the collective approach, cooperative Nash bargained household models.

Keywords: DIVORCE; SUICIDE; LAW (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:99191

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