Risk Sharing and Network Formation

Marcel Fafchamps, Flore Gubert and Dial

No GPRG-WPS-067, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Interpersonal relationships have long been suspected of shaping agrarian institutions, probably because weak formal institutions must be supplemented by interpersonal trust. This is particularly true for informal risk sharing, a fundamental risk coping mechanism for the rural poor (e.g. Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1988, Marcel Fafchamps, 1992, Stephen Coate and Martin Ravallion, 1993, Robert Townsend, 1994, Ethan Ligon et al., 2001, Andrew Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2001).

Keywords: Risk-Sharing; Networks; Dyadic Regressions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I3 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (191)

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