Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership

Michel Le Breton (), Juan Moreno-Ternero, Alexey Savvateev () and Shlomo Weber ()
Additional contact information
Michel Le Breton: Universit de Toulouse 1, GREMAQ and IDEI, Toulouse, France
Shlomo Weber: Southern Methodist University, USA, and the New Economic School, Moscow, Russia

No 10.16, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are indivisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness in metric environments with indivisible projects, where we also explore the performance of well-known solutions, such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus.

Keywords: Stability; Fairness; Membership; Coalition Formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-ppm
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http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ1016.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership (2013)
Working Paper: Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership (2013)
Working Paper: Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership (2012)
Working Paper: Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership (2012)
Working Paper: Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership (2010)
Working Paper: Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership (2010)
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