Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership

Michel Le Breton, Juan Moreno-Ternero, Alexey Savvateev () and Shlomo Weber

No 12-300, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are in-divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among other things, the performance of several well-known solutions (such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these environments.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ppm
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Related works:
Journal Article: Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership (2013)
Working Paper: Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership (2013)
Working Paper: Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership (2012)
Working Paper: Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership (2010)
Working Paper: Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership (2010)
Working Paper: Stability and Fairness in Models with a Multiple Membership (2010)
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