A family of rules to share the revenues from broadcasting sport events
Gustavo Bergantiños and
Juan Moreno-Ternero ()
No 19.07, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics
We consider the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport league events, introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019). We characterize a family of rules compromising between two focal and somewhat polar rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide}. The characterization only makes use of three basic axioms: equal treatment of equals}, additivity and maximum aspirations}}. We also show further interesting features of the family: (i) if we allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then a majority voting equilibrium exists; (ii) the rules within the family yield outcomes that are fully ranked according to the Lorenz dominance criterion; (iii) the family provides rationale for existing schemes in real-life situations.
Keywords: resource allocation; broadcasting; sport events; concede-and-divide; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 C71 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-spo
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Working Paper: A family of rules to share the revenues from broadcasting sport events (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:19.07
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