A family of rules to share the revenues from broadcasting sport events

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Moreno-Ternero

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport league events, introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019). We characterize a family of rules compromising between two focal and somewhat polar rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. The characterization only makes use of three basic axioms: equal treatment of equals, additivity and maximum aspirations. We also show further interesting features of the family: (i) if we allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then a majority voting equilibrium exists; (ii) the rules within the family yield outcomes that are fully ranked according to the Lorenz dominance criterion; (iii) the family provides rationale for existing schemes in real-life situations.

Keywords: resource allocation; broadcasting; sport events; concede-and-divide; equal-split. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06-04, Revised 2019-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94310/1/MPRA_paper_94310.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101139/1/MPRA_paper_101139.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A family of rules to share the revenues from broadcasting sport events (2019)
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