Incumbent and entrant bidding in scoring rule auctions: A study on Italian canteen services

Riccardo Camboni () and Paola Valbonesi
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Riccardo Camboni: DSEA, University of Padova

No 242, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"

Abstract: We empirically investigate incumbents' and entrants' bids on an original dataset of 192 scoring rule auctions for canteen services in Italy. Our findings show that winning rebates are lower (i.e., prices paid by the public buyer are higher) when the contract is awarded to the incumbent supplier. This result is not explained by the observable characteristics of the auction and service awarded. We then develop a simple theoretical model that shows that such a result is consistent with a setting in which the buyer distorts the scoring function to increase the probability that the incumbent wins the auction at the cost of a higher purchasing price.

Keywords: Scoring Rule Auctions; Procurement; Incumbent and Entrant; Auction design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 H57 L88 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des and nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: Incumbent and Entrant Bidding in Scoring Rule Auctions: A Study on Italian Canteen Services (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pad:wpaper:0242

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