Incumbent and Entrant Bidding in Scoring Rule Auctions: A Study on Italian Canteen Services

Camboni Riccardo () and Paola Valbonesi
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Camboni Riccardo: Department of Economics and Management, University of Padova, Via del Santo 33, Padova, 35123, Italy

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2021, vol. 21, issue 1, 1-43

Abstract: We empirically investigate incumbents’ and entrants’ bids on an original dataset of 192 scoring rule auctions for canteen services in Italy. Our findings show that winning rebates are lower (i.e., prices paid by the public buyer are higher) when the contract is awarded to the incumbent supplier. This result is not explained by the observable characteristics of the auction or the service awarded. We develop a simple theoretical model showing that the result is consistent with a setting in which the buyer exploits specific information on the incumbent supplier’s production cost.

Keywords: scoring rule auctions; procurement; incumbent and entrant; favoritism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 H57 L88 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Incumbent and entrant bidding in scoring rule auctions: A study on Italian canteen services (2019)
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2019-0146

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