System and Method for the Efficient Clearing of Spectrum Encumbrances

Lawrence M. Ausubel (), Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom
Additional contact information
Lawrence M. Ausubel: Economics Department, University of Maryland, https://www.econ.umd.edu

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: The present invention is a system and method to sell or procure complementary goods. A complementary good according to the invention is a good whose value or utility is enhanced when paired with another good, such a pair of goods is a communications license to encumbered spectrum and a complementary clearing right to clear the spectrum of its encumbrance. The invention provides automated procedures to facilitate the fashioning and sale of clearing rights so as to enhance the value of the communications license.

Keywords: Auctions; clock auctions; spectrum auctions; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2012, Revised 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in US Patent No. 8,145,555 issued 27 March 2012

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/US8145555.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12acmec

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Cramton ().