System and Method for the Efficient Clearing of Spectrum Encumbrances
Lawrence M. Ausubel (),
Peter Cramton () and
Paul Milgrom ()
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Lawrence M. Ausubel: Economics Department, University of Maryland, http://www.econ.umd.edu
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
The present invention is a system and method to sell or procure complementary goods. A complementary good according to the invention is a good whose value or utility is enhanced when paired with another good, such a pair of goods is a communications license to encumbered spectrum and a complementary clearing right to clear the spectrum of its encumbrance. The invention provides automated procedures to facilitate the fashioning and sale of clearing rights so as to enhance the value of the communications license.
Keywords: Auctions; clock auctions; spectrum auctions; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C78 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2012, Revised 2012
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Published in US Patent No. 8,145,555 issued 27 March 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:12acmec
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