Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Peter Cramton (),
Paul Milgrom (),
Bradley Miller (),
Bridger Mitchell (),
Daniel Vincent and
Robert Wilson ()
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
An effective package bidding mechanism addresses three problems: the exposure problem (the risks a bidder faces in trying to construct an efficiently large combination of licenses), the free-rider problem (the difficulties small bidders have in beating those who bid for larger packages of licenses), and the computational complexity problem (which arises from the fact that the number of possible combinations of licenses is much larger than the number of licenses). Package bidding offers the possibility of an improvement over individual-license bidding only when there are strong complementarities and the pattern of those complementarities varies across bidders. Package bidding works satisfactorily only when the auction rules have been carefully designed to manage all three problems.
Keywords: Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Multiple-Round Auctions; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D61 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/98cra-s ... -package-bidding.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98cra2
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Cramton ().