Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria

George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson ()
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Larry Samuelson: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We examine contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria, in which a player’s actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within epsilon of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner’s ex ante perfect epsilon-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure equilibria.

Keywords: Epsilon equilibrium; ex ante payoff; multistage game; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2003-08-15
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Related works:
Journal Article: Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria (2005)
Working Paper: Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:03-021

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