Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information

Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy.

Keywords: Core; Asymmetric Information; Incentive Compatibility; Exchange Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2003-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Core convergence with asymmetric information (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:03-027

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