The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

Daniel Diermeier (), Hülya Eraslan and Antonio Merlo
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Daniel Diermeier: Kellogg School of Management,Northwestern University

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: In this article we present an overview of our recent research on the effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. Our approach is based on the solution and estimation of a multilateral bargaining model which we use to investigate the consequences of constitutional features of parliamentary democracy for the formation and stability of coalition governments.

Keywords: Political Stability; Coalition Governments; Constitutional Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 H19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2003-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:03-037

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