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A Dynamic Model of Voting

Arianna Degan

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We propose and estimate a dynamic model of voting with asymmetric information incorporating the three main factors affecting voting choices of individual citizens: party identification, policy preferences, and candidates’ valence. Using individual level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections, we identify and estimate (1) the distribution of voters’ policy positions and (2) candidates’ valence. In addition to providing an equilibrium interpretation of the observed voting profiles and electoral outcomes, we use the estimated model to conduct counterfactual experiments to assess the relative importance of candidates’ policy positions, valence, and voters’ information on the outcomes of elections and to evaluate the performance of the electoral process.

Keywords: Party identification; policy preferences; consecutive elections; valence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2003-11-23, Revised 2004-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:04-015

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