Platform Ownership

Volker Nocke, Martin Peitz and Konrad Stahl ()
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Konrad Stahl: Department of Economics, University of Mannheim

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We develop a general theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact. The platform may be owned by a single large, or many small independent or vertically integrated intermediaries. We provide a positive and normative analysis of the impact of platform ownership structure on platform size. The strength of network effects is important in the ranking of ownership structures by induced platform size and welfare. While vertical integration may be welfare-enhancing if network effects are weak, monopoly platform ownership is socially preferred if they are strong. These are also the ownership structures likely to emerge.

Keywords: Two-Sided Markets; Network Effects; Intermediation; Product Diversity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2004-07-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Platform Ownership (2007)
Working Paper: Platform Ownership (2004)
Working Paper: Platform Ownership (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:04-029

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