Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

Martin Cripps and Larry Samuelson
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Larry Samuelson: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player’s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that reputations disappear in sufficiently long discounted finitely-repeated games.

Keywords: Reputation; Imperfect Monitoring; Repeated Games; Commitment; Private Beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2004-03-01, Revised 2004-07-28
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/file ... ng-papers/04-031.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships (2007)
Working Paper: Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships (2006)
Working Paper: Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships (2004)
Working Paper: Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships (2004)
Working Paper: Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships (2004)
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