Job Search with Bidder Memories
Carlos Carrillo-Tudela (),
Guido Menzio () and
Eric Smith ()
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers, in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding, have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.
Keywords: Job search; recall; wage determination; Diamond paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 J42 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-lab
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https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/file ... ng-papers/09-027.pdf (application/pdf)
Journal Article: JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES (2011)
Working Paper: Job search with bidder memories (2009)
Working Paper: Job Search with Bidder Memories (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:09-027
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