Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version

George Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski ()
Additional contact information
Wojciech Olszewski: Department of Economics, Northwestern University

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.

Keywords: Repeated games; bounded recall strategies; folk theorem; imperfect monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2008-05-30, Revised 2010-03-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/file ... ng-papers/10-007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:10-007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 133 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Administrator ().