Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications

George Mailath and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: This note provides several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and De Marzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously covered.

Keywords: Adverse selection; separation; differentiable strategies; incentive-compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C73 D82 D83 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications (2013)
Working Paper: Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:10-032

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