Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence

Yuichi Yamamoto ()
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Yuichi Yamamoto: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players observe statistically independent signals. As an application, we develop a simple sufficient condition for the existence of asymptotically efficient equilibria, and establish a folk theorem for N-player prisoner’s dilemma. All these results are robust to a perturbation of the signal distribution, and hence remain true even under almost-independent monitoring.

Keywords: repeated game; private monitoring; conditional independence; belief-free review-strategy equilibrium; prisoner’s dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 74 pages
Date: 2012-02-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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