Identifying Structural Models of Committee Decisions with Heterogeneous Tastes and Ideological Bias
Yonghong An and
Xun Tang ()
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Xun Tang: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
We study the nonparametric identification and estimation of a structural model for committee decisions. Members of a committee share a common information set, but differ in ideological bias while processing multiple information sources and in individual tastes while weighing multiple objectives. We consider two cases of the model where committee members have or don't have strategic incentives for making recommendations that conform with the committee decision. For both cases, pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria exist, and we show how to use variations in the common information set to recover the distribution of members' private types from individual recommendation patterns. Building on the identification result, we estimate a structural model of interest rate decisions by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) at the Bank of England. We find some evidence that recommendations from external committee members are less distorted by strategic incentives than internal members. There is also evidence that MPC members differ more in their tastes for multiple objectives than in ideological bias.
Keywords: Committee decisions; nonparametric identification; MPC at the Bank of England (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-ecm
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Journal Article: Identifying Structural Models of Committee Decisions With Heterogeneous Tastes and Ideological Bias (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:13-058
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