Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout Risk, Third Version

Francesc Dilme and Fei Li ()

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: This paper analyzes a dynamic education signaling model with dropout risk. Workers pay an education cost per unit of time and face an exogenous dropout risk before graduation. Since low-productivity workers’ cost of education is high, pooling with early dropouts helps them avoid a high education cost. In equilibrium, low-productivity workers choose to endoge- nously drop out over time, so the productivity of workers in college increases as the education process progresses. We find that the exogenous dropout risk generates rich dynamics in the endogenous dropout behavior of workers, and the maximum education length is decreasing in the prior about a worker being highly productive. We also extend the baseline model by allowing human capital accumulation.

Keywords: Dynamic Games; Dynamic Signaling; Dropout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2013-09-03, Revised 2014-04-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/14-014.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:14-014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 133 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Administrator ().