Stochastic Games with Hidden States, Second Version
Yuichi Yamamoto ()
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Yuichi Yamamoto: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players ob- serve payoffs and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. Public randomization is available. We find that, very generally, the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state in the limit as the discount factor goes to one. We also provide a re- cursive characterization of the equilibrium payoff set and establish the folk theorem.
Keywords: stochastic game; hidden state; connectedness; stochastic selfgeneration; folk theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03-29, Revised 2015-06-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:15-019
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