We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known
Yuichi Yamamoto ()
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Yuichi Yamamoto: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
This paper considers infinite-horizon stochastic games with hidden states and hidden actions. The state changes over time, players observe only a noisy public signal about the state each period, and actions are private information. In this model, uncertainty about the monitoring structure does not disappear. We show how to construct an approximately efficient equilibrium in a repeated Cournot game. Then we extend it to a general case and obtain the folk theorem using ex-post equilibria under a mild condition.
Keywords: stochastic game; hidden state; public monitoring; pseudoergodic strategy; folk theorem; ex-post equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 121 pages
Date: 2014-03-29, Revised 2017-04-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:17-011
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