A Very Robust Auction Mechanism
Richard McLean () and
Andrew Postlewaite ()
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Richard McLean: Department of Economics, Rutgers University
PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of many potential buyers. There are two equally likely states of the world. Potential buyers receive noisy signals of the state of the world. The accuracies of buyers Â’signals may diÂ¤er. A buyerÂ’s valuation is the sum of a common value component that depends on the state and an idiosyncratic private value component independent of the state. The seller knows nothing about the accuracies of the signals or about buyersÂ’ beliefs about the accuracies. It is common knowledge among buyers that the accuracies of the signals are conditionally independent and uniformly bounded below 1 and above 1=2, and nothing more. We demonstrate a modifiÂ…ed second price auction that has the property that, for any " > 0; the sellerÂ’s expected revenue will be within " of the highest buyer expected value when the number of buyers is sufficiently large and buyers make undominated bids.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2018-01-16, Revised 2018-01-16
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:18-001
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