Allocation Mechanisms Without Reduction

David Dillenberger () and Uzi Segal
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David Dillenberger: University of Pennsylvania

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We study a simple variant of the house allocation problem (one-sided matching). We demonstrate that agents with recursive preferences may systematically prefer one allocation mechanism to the other, even among mechanisms that are considered to be the same in standard models, in the sense that they induce the same probability distribution over successful matchings. Using this, we propose a new Priority Groups mechanism and provide conditions under which it is preferred to two popular mechanisms, Random Top Cycle and Random Serial Dictatorship.

Keywords: House allocation problem; Non-expected utility; Ran-dom Top Cycle; Random Serial Dictatorship; Reduction of compound lotteries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2021-02-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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