Securing solidarity

Lisa Bruttel and Eva Markowsky

No 104, CEPA Discussion Papers from Center for Economic Policy Analysis

Abstract: Individuals who speak out against autocratic tendencies are taking a significant personal risk. This study tests whether forming preventive solidarity networks increases the likelihood of solidarity. In a laboratory experiment, we use an adapted version of the solidarity game, in which one of four group members may lose all their money at random. All group members decide how much they want to give to the individual who lost their endowment. Comparing two treatments with and without communication, we find that ex-ante communication substantially increases solidarity. In a further treatment, we inform participants that forming explicit agreements during the communication would be beneficial. This subtle suggestion doubles the effectiveness of communication in terms of solidarity. Further analysis suggests that, in our setting, solidarity is contingent on trusting that others will behave in a similar way. Higher trust in humans predicts a greater willingness to give, most likely because generally trusting individuals anticipate more solidarity from others towards them as well. The informational hint appears to foster such trust within the group strongly, rendering general trust irrelevant for one’s own solidaristic behaviour.

Keywords: solidarity; communication; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D74 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pot:cepadp:104

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