A simple measure of strategic uncertainty attitudes

Lisa Bruttel

No 107, CEPA Discussion Papers from Center for Economic Policy Analysis

Abstract: This paper introduces a simple incentivized measure of individual attitudes towards strategic uncertainty. This measure is based on the idea that the size of the difference between the expected profit from playing a game and the value that an individual places on playing that game provides information about how much they like or dislike the strategic uncertainty involved. This measure explains trusting decisions in the trust game, where standard risk aversion measures have no explanatory power. Furthermore, it correlates across different games and predicts behavior associated with strategic uncertainty outside the laboratory.

Keywords: strategic uncertainty; risk; trust; elicitation method; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pot:cepadp:107

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