Endogenous queue number determination in G/M/s systems

Vasco Alves

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.

Keywords: Queues—Applications: strategic interactions; Queues—Multichannel: determining number; Games/group decisions: strategic queueing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 Y80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Endogenous queue number determination in G/M/s systems (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:104517

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