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Endogenous queue number determination in G/M/s systems

Vasco Alves ()

4OR, 2021, vol. 19, issue 1, No 7, 113-126

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.

Keywords: Queues—Applications: strategic interactions; Queues—Multichannel: determining number; Games/group decisions: strategic queueing; C73; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10288-020-00437-y

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