Leadership by Confidence in Teams

Hajime Kobayashi and Hideo Suehiro

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study endogenous signaling in teams by analyzing a team production problem with endogenous timing. Each agent of the team is privately endowed with some level of confidence about team productivity. Each of them must then commit a level of effort in one of two periods. At the end of each period, each agent observes his partner's move in this period. Both agents are rewarded by a team output determined by team productivity and total invested effort. Each agent must personally incur the cost of effort that he invested. We show a sufficient condition under which sender and receiver emerge endogenously in a stable equilibrium. This result implies that leadership in teams emerges through the leader's signaling incentives only based on his confidence.

Keywords: Endogenous Signaling; Team Production; Leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:10717

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