Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism

Oleg Shchetinin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I develop a model of contracting under reciprocal altruism accounting for some evidence which is paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical models with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine; for the Control Game the model predicts that an equilibrium can exhibit "no effect of control", "hidden cost of control", or "positive effect of control", depending on the characteristics of the actors, as observed in the lab. This suggests that reciprocal altruism modeling could be fruitful more generally in applications of contract theory.

Keywords: Reciprocal Altruism, Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation; Behavioral Economics, Signaling, Contract Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15430/2/MPRA_paper_15430.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Contracting Under Reciprocal Altruism (2009)
Working Paper: Contracting under Reciprocal Altruism (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:13457

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().